Are Our Problems Purely Short Term (Or Bernanke’s Contradiction)?

Last weekend, I posted a link to a speech given by Fed Governor Ben Bernanke entitled  “Economic Prospect for the Long Term”. The speech is interesting because Bernanke rarely touches on the topic of long-term growth, but on this occasion he addressed the fears of many young graduates (at least those graduates of a reflective disposition) that they face a difficult future:

Now here’s a question–in fact, a key question, I imagine, from your perspective. What does the future hold for the working lives of today’s graduates? The economic implications of the first two waves of innovation, from the steam engine to the Boeing 747, were enormous…..

…… some knowledgeable observers have recently made the case that the IT revolution, as important as it surely is, likely will not generate the transformative economic effects that flowed from the earlier technological revolutions. As a result, these observers argue, economic growth and change in coming decades likely will be noticeably slower than the pace to which Americans have become accustomed. Such an outcome would have important social and political–as well as economic–consequences for our country and the world.

To counter this rational pessimism (which this blog espouses), Bernanke gave three main counter arguments.

  1. We can’t predict the technological future
  2. The IT revolution has barely started and its best fruit, in terms of economic growth, may yet to be harvested
  3. Globalisation allows the generation, transmission and adaption of new ideas to take place on an unprecedented scale

The only problem with this rose-tinted spectacle view of the world is that it flies in the face of the market’s own evidence. In a speech just two months earlier, Bernanke tackled the question of why interest rates were so low. The collapse of nominal interest rates is visible everywhere, as one of the charts accompanying his speech shows (click for larger image):

10-Year Government Bond Yield jpeg

Bernanke then described a nominal interest rate as being composed of three components: a) expected inflation, b) expected short-term real interest rates and c) the term premium (risk associated with a longer maturity bond). A chart from his speech disaggregating the U.S. nominal rate into these three components can be seen here (click for larger image):

Decomposition of 10 Year Treasury jpeg

Note that the expected average short-term real interest rate has come down from around 2% in the year 2000 to essentially zero now. And what does this mean in economic terms. Bernanke provides the answer:

In the longer term, real interest rates are determined primarily by nonmonetary factors, such as the expected return to capital investments, which in turn is closely related to the underlying strength of the economy. The fact that market yields currently incorporate an expectation of very low short-term real interest rates over the next 10 years suggests that market participants anticipate persistently slow growth and, consequently, low real returns to investment. In other words, the low level of expected real short rates may reflect not only investor expectations for a slow cyclical recovery but also some downgrading of longer-term growth prospects.

The disjoint between the two speeches is obvious. In the first, Bernanke’s message—when talking to a class of fresh-faced new graduates—is a relatively upbeat one: don’t give up on growth. In the second, a speech given at a macroeconomic conference, Bernanke suggests that the market is signalling that we have a growth problem.

This also has huge implications for fiscal and monetary policy. If growth has slowed in recent years due to underlying technological factors and not just due to the credit crisis, then it will be exceedingly difficult to kick start the economy through unconventional monetary policy and aggressive fiscal injections. The policy of quantitative easing, which monetary authorities are pursuing in most advanced countries, is premised on the idea that there exists a gap between what the economy could be producing and what it is actually producing (the so called output gap). Should that gap prove a mirage then current policies will be ineffectual.

Links for the Week Ending May 19th

  • The central theme of this blog is that global economic growth will likely fall over the long term due to climate change, resource depletion, demographics, declining technology driven productivity gains and falling demand as technology concentrates earnings and wealth into an ever-shrinking winner’s enclosure. Fed Governor Ben Bernanke just presented the opposing argument against some (but not all) of my concerns in a commencement speech entitled “Economic Prospect for the Long Term” here.
  • Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain Institute has written a beautiful take-down in The Atlantic of all those who argue that renewable electricity provision is a utopian dream (price, intermittency, lack of transportability, blah, blah, blah). The article is actually a response to Charles Mann’s previous article in the same magazine titled “What If We Never Run Out of Oil?”, the gist of which has found much favour in the financial press, especially The Wall Street Journal. Germany will provide a battleground for this particular argument. Renewable energy pessimists point to the uptick in coal production there, while renewable optimists see this is a short-term blip on an otherwise smooth progress toward a renewables-dominated electricity future. I intend to post about this controversy going forward.
  • New pipeline capacity means that the days of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude being at a substantial discount to Brent crude oil are ending. Accordingly, Brent, which is now used as the global benchmark reference rate, will more closely determine gasoline prices in the U.S. For details on what is happening in the U.S. see this Reuters article by Robert Campbell here.
  • One of The Financial Times big beasts, Martin Wolf, gave climate change risk a well-earned airing on Wednesday. The FT, to its credit, sometimes treats the problem of global warming with the seriousness it deserves, unlike The Wall Street Journal in the U.S.
  • And staying with climate change, there has been a bit of ‘has it, or hasn’t’ with respect to the reporting over whether average daily atmospheric CO2 concentration had passed the 400 parts per million (ppm) level. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which operates the Mauna Loa Observatory that collects the benchmark data in Hawaii, originally reported 9 May as the day the world exceeded 400 ppm based on Coordinated Universal Time (UCT), better known to Brits as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). The Scripps Institution of Oceanography, which publishes the daily data here, uses Hawaiian local time, and ended up recording the 400 pm mark a number of days later. Regardless, this record is now officially established and it is not a good one for humanity.

More Gas Out There (But at What Price?)

The important biennial assessment of United States natural gas resources was released last month by the Potential Gas Committee, a grouping of 145 volunteer specialists in the natural gas field. The press release for the report can be found here and the accompanying slides here.

The report always attracts a lot of erroneous claims that the United States has 100-years of natural gas; indeed, President Obama repeated the same mistake in his State of the Union address that I previously blogged on here. The report is principally concerned with “technically recoverable natural gas resources”; that is, those gas resources that can be recovered if price was not an issue. To quote directly from the press release:

Dr. Curtis cautioned, however, that the current assessment assumes neither a time schedule nor a specific market price for the discovery and production of future gas supply. “Assessments of the Potential Gas Committee represent our best understanding of the geological endowment of the technically recoverable natural gas resource of the United States,” he explained.

Keeping this caveat in mind, fracking technology has nonetheless led to a boom in gas prospecting, which is clearly visible in the recent uptrend in natural gas resources stated in consecutive biennial reports (click for larger image):

Total Potential Gas Reserves 2013 jpeg

The 2,226 trillion cubic feet of traditional gas resources (traditional by their definition includes shale gas) compares with 305 tcf of proved reserves as published by the Energy Information Administration (EIA).

Natural Gas Assessment 2013 jpeg

The EIA’s proved reserves of  crude oil, natural gas liquids and natural gas can be found here (latest figures are for 2010); moreover, the 305 tcf is for dry natural gas and can be found in this EIA table here. Proved reserves (as opposed to resources) are those known gas reservoirs from which gas can be extracted at existing prices, technology and infrastructure. To put these numbers in context, the U.S. consumed 25.5 tcf in 2012, so proved reserves are sufficient for 12 years of consumption.

Of the three resource categories—probably, possible and speculative—probable resources are equivalent to 28  years of 2012 equivalent consumption. A more thorough treatment of the assessment methodology and category definitions can be found in this this appendix to the MIT 2001 interdisciplinary report entitled “The Future of Natural Gas” which is well worth reading and can be found here.

Resource Assessment by Category jpeg

The migration of speculative, possible and probable resource toward, or into, proved reserve is dependent on two main variables: price and technology. A rising price may move some possible resources into proved reserves, but it may also reduce the competitiveness of natural gas vis a vis coal and renewables and ultimately stymie economic growth. Accordingly, any commentary within the media claiming that fracking technology has removed the energy constraint on the U.S. economy should be taken with a pinch of salt.

The Absurdity of ‘Abenomics’ and the PM’s ‘Three Bendy Arrows’ (Part 4: Bubble Economics)

As I write this post, the yen has broken below 100 to the U.S. dollar and the Nikkei has closed at a five-year high. So surely Abenomics is working, isn’t it? Well, it is certainly pushing up asset prices. Indeed, if I were still in my old job as a Japanese equity hedge fund manager I would have swung the bat as hard as I could after Bank of Japan Governor Kuroda’s original April 4 announcement. And I would plan to keep swinging the bat well into the future. Indeed, if my risk manager was not having a heart attack by now, I would feel I had not done my job properly.

Strange as it may seem, this is the logical path to follow given that Kuroda has based his analysis lock, stock and barrel on New Keynesian monetary theory. The two canonical papers that sit behind this are Paul Krugman’s “It’s Baaack! Japan’s Slump and the return of the Liquidity Trap” and Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford’s “The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy”. The Eggertsson and Woodford paper, which we can think of as Krugman 2.0, has become the intellectual bedrock for the Fed in fighting deflation and is much quoted by Fed Governor Ben Bernanke.

Both papers are difficult reads for the non-economist, but, as I mentioned in my previous post, the Richmond Fed has made available a “A Citizen’s Guide to Unconventional Monetary Policy” for non-specialists that contains the core policy prescription of the two academic papers referred to above.  From A Citizen’s Guide, the critical passage is this:

In the Eggertsson and Woodford model, the com- mitment to making monetary policy “too easy” would only stimulate economic activity if the commitment is viewed by the public as highly credible. That is, markets must believe that the central bank will, in fact, hold rates “too low” in the future simply because it promised to in the past, despite the fact that at that point, it would wish to raise rates to avoid inflation.

Krugman, ever the wordsmith, put this more succinctly:

The way to make monetary policy effective, then, is for the central bank to credibly promise to be irresponsible…

Now we now that asset price inflation operates on a different time scale to consumer price inflation: indeed, Japan’s stock price indices are already up 50% from their December lows, while consumer price inflation has barely budged. Nonetheless, to whatever level asset prices go, Kuroda has to keep his mouth firmly shut to have any chance of the changing public perceptions of future inflation. He is not allowed to make Greenspan-type gnomic references to “irrational exuberance”, let alone pull back from Japanese government bond buying. He must drive Japan’s monetary policy as if he was in one of those defective Toyota cars that was recalled due to a faulty accelerator pedal that got stuck to the floor.

This, of course, is a bubble meister’s charter, since for Kuroda to succeed in changing consumer expectations he must keep the accelerator pedal depressed for years. It is also worth keeping in mind that the Bank of Japan’s newly minted 2% inflation target is only an intermediate goal. As I explained in my last post, what monetary policy is really trying to achieve here is the closure of an output gap, i.e., the difference between where the economy is currently operating and where it could be operating if labour and capital were fully employed.

Moreover, the problem is perceived as one of lack of demand, not supply. The idea is that households won’t spend today because they think goods will get cheaper tomorrow. In effect, even if they hold cash at the bank earning zero, deflation means that they are getting a comfortable real return. The policy goal a la Krugman, Woodford and Eggertsson is to make that real return negative. And the only way to create a negative real return when interest rates are zero is to have inflation. If you can persuade the populace that inflation is barrelling toward them in the future, then they will cut savings and increase consumption now—or so the theory goes.

In addition, if the economy is idling below potential with unused capital and labour, any sudden jump in demand will result in high productivity and economic growth. Growth, in turn, will lead to higher wages and greater government tax receipts. Thus—and this is where the magic of macroeconomics comes in—the act of spending more now results in higher wages and living standards in the future.

Surely, a classic win-win: more consumption and more growth. What’s not to like? Nonetheless, there are a number of problems. First, how smoothly this all works depends to a large degree on the extent of the output gap. An article by Gavyn Davies in The Financial Times takes a look at the difference between output gaps if we just extrapolate past growth and those if we take into account supply side phenomenon (click for larger image) for a number of countries.

Output Gap Measurement jpeg

He explains the graphs in more detail: Continue reading

Links for the Week Ending 12th May

  • Most of the articles dealing with Niall Ferguson’s comments on Keynes are light weight and not worth the bother of reading, but this article in American Prospect via The Browser goes a little deeper. And if you want to give the subject even more respect, then I highly recommend a paper by David Blanchflower, former member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, who wrote an insightful and important paper in 2004 called “Money, Sex and Happiness: An Empirical Study”. Economics, sex and happiness may appear strange bedfellows (pun, of course, intended), but they really aren’t.
  • A few weeks back, The Economist did a piece on climate sensitivity that got a lot of things right but also a lot of things wrong. Nonetheless, I thought Skeptical Science’s original riposte by Dana Nuccitelli lacked subtlety since it questioned why The Economist was looking a climate science at all. Given that The Economist is, in effect, the house magazine of the English-speaking global corporate, financial and political elite, I would think its coverage of the subject should be welcomed. Further, Nuccitelli didn’t realize that The Economist‘s deputy editor, Emma Duncan, has been covering the subject for decades—and in a far more serious and sympathetic manner than almost all the rest of the Anglo-Saxon business press. Anyway, Nuccitelli has followed up with a much better article: a climate sensitivity 101 for The Guardian. Well worth a read.
  • Staying with The Economist, last week’s issue had a long article titled “Generation Jobless” on global youth unemployment.  While the author did touch on the impact that disruptive technology was having on the job market, it still gave top billing to a) lack of growth, b) job cartels and c) poor links between education and work. Personally, I think they have the problem the wrong way around. Technology and resource constraints are the reason for a lack of growth, particularly in advanced countries, so governments have to create labour policies that take low growth as a given. Further, as The Economist points out,  “new technology is unleashing a storm of “disruptive innovation” which is forcing firms to rethink their operations from the ground up. Companies are constantly redesigning work—for example they are separating routine tasks (which can be automated or contracted out) from skilled jobs. They are also constantly redesigning themselves by “upsizing”, “downsizing” and “contracting out”. Against this background, I believe the state will have to take a far more interventionist path with regard to employment, otherwise all hell will eventually break loose.
  • The social geographer Danny Dorling has a wonderful article in this week’s New Statesman (part of a special on Britain’s ruling elite) running the numbers on the changing concentration of wealth in the U.K, but unfortunately it is not available online. However, Dorling’s past articles, lectures and papers are available at his University of Sheffield web page here and include some cracking data visualisation graphics; for example, here and here. Meanwhile, Simon Kuper in The Financial Times dissects the French elite here.
  • And The Observer charts the rise and rise of London, the home of the global elite, as it continues to detach itself from the rest of the U.K.

Data Watch: FAO Food Price Index for April 2013

At the beginning of each month, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) releases a series of price indices for a variety of food commodities (here). The headline FAO Food Price Index is a composite of five food groupings: meat, dairy, cereals, oils and fats and sugar. The base 100 is the indexed averaged price for the 2002-2004 period. The April 2013 index number was released on May 9th. Key points are as follows:

  • The FAO Food Price Index averaged 215.5 for April 2013, up from 213.2 the previous month
  • The index was up 2.4 points from the 213.1 recorded in April 2012, or 1.1 in percentage terms
  • In inflation adjusted terms, the Food Price Index stood at 143.1 for April 2013 against the 2002-2004 base of 100

The nominal and real price indices have followed a trajectory not dissimilar to the global oil price (click chart for larger image). Here is food:

FAO Food Price Index April jpeg

And here is oil:

Spot Oil Prices jpg

As in March, the main driver behind the upward movement in the overall index is the Dairy component. The Dairy Price Index rose 14.9% in April over the previous month and is up 39.4% from April 2012. The principal cause for this surge has been the drought in New Zealand; NASA has two images comparing April 2013 with April 2009, a normal year, here. The drought has now broken, but the after-effects are still being felt. The sub-indices are available from the FAO here.

The Absurdity of ‘Abenomics’ and the PM’s ‘Three Bendy Arrows’ (Part 3: Monetary Policy and a Fictitious Can)

In my two previous posts on Abenomics (here and here), I argued that Japan is a post-growth economy. As the OECD explains in its Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2012, growth can be achieved in only three ways:

Economic growth can be increased either by raising the labour and capital inputs used in production, or by improving the overall efficiency in how these inputs are used together, i.e. higher multifactor productivity (MFP). Growth accounting involves decomposing GDP growth into these three components, providing an essential tool for policy makers to identify the underlying drivers of growth.

Therefore, if I am to be proved wrong in my declaration that Japan is post-growth, Abenomics must be able to boost labour inputs, and/or increase capital inputs and/or improve multifactor productivity (innovation and efficiency). By definition, the Abe agenda must encompass one or more of the three—there are no other means of achieving growth.

Against this background, Prime Minister Abe has given top billing to monetary stimulus within his ‘three arrow’ policy agenda. He campaigned and won a general election on a pledge to force Japan’s central bank, the Bank of Japan, to adopt a binding 2% inflation target through unlimited monetary easing and thus slay deflation. Moreover, to execute such a strategy, he backed a new BOJ governor, Haruhiko Kuroda, who took office in March. Kuroda, in turn, has executed Abe’s monetary policy agenda with gusto. (For a fascinating article on how Kuroda deftly manoeuvred the BOJ board into unanimously support the policy shift, see this Reuters’ article here).

In contrast with the speeches of his predecessor, Masaaki Shirakawa, Kuroda’s early utterances have been accompanied by a very thin chart pack dominated by the now famous ‘all the twos’ slide (click for larger image):

BOJ Quantitative Easing jpeg

These measures will give rise to an extraordinary jump in the monetary base over a two-year period from ¥138 trillion at the end of 2012 to ¥270 trillion at the end of 2014. In fiscal 2012, Japan’s GDP was estimated at approximately ¥475 trillion in nominal terms, so the monetary base is targeted to rise from around 30% of GDP to 55% of GDP.

Monetary Base Target jpeg

By contrast, the action by the Federal Reserve Board in the U.S. looks positively cautious (here), with the monetary base a modest 17% of GDP. Continue reading